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Abstract
We test the assumption that preferences are unchanged throughout a strategic game
in the absence of feedback. To do so, we study the relationship between the strategic
nature of a game and playersidentication in social groups. We present evidence that
the strategic nature of the game a¤ects the strength of identity. We also show when the
change in identity occurs and what causes this change. In our experiment, the subjects
play one of two versions of the Prisoners Dilemma game where the attractiveness of the
uncooperative action is manipulated. We refer to the version with a relatively attractive
uncooperative action as the "Mean Game" and the other as the "Nice Game." We place
each subject into one of two groups. Throughout the experimental procedure we measure
identity, as standard in the psychology literature, in order to assess the extent to which
subjects identify with their group. First, we nd evidence of an interaction between
the strategic nature of the game and the action selected in the game as a¤ecting the
identity of the subject. We nd that in the Mean Game, there is little di¤erence in the
change in identication of those playing cooperatively against an ingroup member and
those playing uncooperatively. However, in the Nice Game, those playing cooperatively
against an ingroup member exhibit a signicantly stronger change in identication than
those playing uncooperatively. We nd that the opposite is true for outgroup matches.
Also, we show that the change in identity does not occur after initial inspection of the game
but rather largely after the action choice has been made. Finally, we present evidence of
an explanation of the e¤ect: identity is enhanced by actions which are perceived to be less
competitive and more cooperative.
The authors wish to thank Astri Muren, Debbie Prentice and Jack Worrall for helpful comments.
ySanta Clara University, Department of Psychology.
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1 Introduction
The preferences of players in a strategic game are of fundamental importance in the analysis
of that game. Even if players consider the welfare of other players, it is assumed that
preferences are unchanged throughout the play of a one shot game without feedback. In
this paper, we test the assumption that preferences are indeed unchanged. Specially, we ask
whether other-regarding preferences can be a¤ected by the strategic nature of the game, even
without feedback concerning the action of the opponent.
Generally speaking, we seek to better understand the relationship between the strategic
nature of a game and other-regarding preferences. We measure these preferences by seeking a
measure of identity, as is standard in the psychology literature. Consistent with this literature,
we view the measure of identity as suggesting the extent to which the subject values material
outcomes of others in their social group.
In the experiment described below, each subject plays one of two versions of a prisoners
dilemma game and we measure their identity. In both versions of the game, each player
simultaneously decides to take a "cooperative" action or an "uncooperative" action. In one
version of the game, the attractiveness of the uncooperative action is larger than that in the
other version. We refer to the former as the "Mean Game" and the latter as the "Nice Game."
We allocate subjects into groups based on a trivial criterion. Before the subjects are aware
of the strategic setting, we take a baseline measure of identity. Subjects are then presented
with either the Mean or Nice Game. Before the subjects decide on their action, their group
identity is again measured. The subjects then make a choice of action in the game and we
subsequently take nal identity measure.
We nd evidence of an interaction between the game type and action choice as a¤ecting
identity. Specically, we nd that when playing another member of the group (or ingroup
member), the change in identity for Nice Game is larger than that for the Mean Game (Result
1). However, the opposite is true when the subject plays a member of the other group, or
outgroup member (Result 5). We present evidence that the change in identity which does
occur, does not happen upon initial inspection of the game but rather primarily after the
action choice has been made (Result 2). We present evidence that identity is enhanced by
actions which are considered to be less competitive and more cooperative (Result 3). We
interpret Result 3 as a possible explanation for Result 1. Finally, the results presented in this
paper suggest that measuring preferences through SV O or GARP could possibly a¤ect the
preferences which the techniques are designed to measure.
1.1 Identity and Psychology (for economists)
For some time, psychologists have known that allocating people into groups will often induce
behavior which favors ingroup members at the expense of outgroup members.1 A typical such
1For instance see Tajfel (1970), Tajfel et. al. (1971), Tajfel (1978), Tajfel and Turner (1979) and Tajfel
and Turner (1986).
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experiment would allocate subjects into a group and observe ingroup favoritism or outgroup
discrimination. Such behavior was thought to be more pronounced when identity was more
e¤ectively manipulated. However, in order to verify the e¤ectiveness of the manipulation,
experimenters would seek to measure the identity of the subject.2 An economist can interpret
the identity measure as indicating the extent to which the subject positively values the material
outcomes of ingroup members or negatively values the material outcomes outgroup members.3
Subsequent identity research sought to clarify which features of the group or the environ-
ment would induce such behavior and what motivates subjects to categorize themselves in
terms of the social group. Research has indicated that group distinctiveness (Brewer, 1991),
group prestige (Ellemers et. al. 2002), similarity (Ip, Chiu and Wan, 2006), common fate
(Brown and Wade, 1987), interpersonal interaction (Pettigrew, 1998) and group homogeneity
(Vanbeselaere, 1991) can all a¤ect the identication of a person with a social group. Our
research suggests that the strategic nature of the game should be added to the list.
In our experiment we placed the subjects into groups which did not exist prior to the
experiment and for which membership was based on a trivial criterion: the last digit of their
student identication number. In the psychology literature, this experimental technique is
often used because it is thought that observing identity motivated behavior in groups unconta-
minated by history and based on trivial criteria indicates that identication with a social group
is a fundamental human trait and that categorization alone can imply ingroup favoritism and
outgroup discrimination.4 Such social groups are referred to as "minimal groups", although
the term has a somewhat more specic meaning in the psychology literature.5 However, the
groups in this paper are designed to be in the spirit of the minimal group therefore we refer
to our groups as "minimal."
As we do here, psychologists have conducted experiments examining the role of identity
on the outcomes of games. For instance, see Kramer and Brewer (1984), Brewer and Kramer
(1986), Dawes, Van De Kragt and Orbell (1988) and Wit and Wilke (1992). As is common
in the literature, the authors manipulate some aspect of the environment, which is thought to
a¤ect the identity of the subject, and observe its e¤ect on behavior. We contrast the present
paper with this literature as not only do we make explicit measurements of identity but we
make several measurements throughout the experiment.
Related to identity, Social Value Orientation (SV O)6 seeks to learn the preferences of
subjects by soliciting choices in a series of dictator games. It seems that SV O is better
suited as a measure of the general disposition of a subject rather than as a measure of the
disposition towards a particular opponent.7 An advantage of measuring social preferences
2See Abrams and Hogg (1999).
3Examples of such a scale include include: Brown et. al. (1986), Gaertner et. al. (1989), Grieve and Hogg
(1999), Hogg et. al. (1993), Hogg and Grieve (1999), Hogg and Hardie (1991,1992), Reid and Hogg (2005) and
Swann et. al. (2003).
4Turner and Bourhis (1996).
5See Diehl (1990).
6Developed by Griesinger and Livingston (1973).
7De Cremer and Van Vugt (1999), De Cremer and Van Dijk (2002) and De Cremer et. al. (2008).
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through techniques such as SV O and GARP 8 is that the responses are incentive compatible: a
subject receives payment on the basis of their decisions and therefore has a material incentive
to respond truthfully. One drawback of these techniques is that the the subjects are classied
into one of only a few possible categories, such as "competitive", "egoistic" and "altruistic."
By contrast, the standard measure of psychology provides a more rich characterization of the
social preferences of the subject. For instance, the measure of identity in our data ranges
from a minimum of 2 to a maximum of 7. Another potential drawback of the SV O and
GARP techniques is that they tend to ignore the nature (or identity) of the "other" subject.
Therefore, little is known about the properties of SV O and GARP when the identity of the
other subject is taken into account. However, by using the psychologists measure of identity
we can access the huge literature associated with the advances made in that regard. Finally,
the results presented here suggest that it is possible that eliciting preferences through SV O
or GARP might a¤ect the very preferences which they are designed to measure.
1.2 Identity and Economics
Like psychologists, economists have known for some time that material payo¤s accruing to
one person can a¤ect the well being of another person.9 This strand of literature is often
referred to as "other-regarding preferences" or "social preferences." Specicially, if xown are the
material payo¤s accruing to a person and xother are the material payo¤s accruing to another
person, the utility of a person u(xown; xother) is inuenced by both terms. There exist many
economic theory papers which model such social preferences by adopting di¤erent forms of
u(xown; xother).10
Research has suggested that, in settings similar to that in our experiment, there is a link
between group identication and bias.11 For instance, Perrault and Bourhis (1999) nd that
in the minimal group setting the subjects who identify more strongly with the group treated
ingroup members more favorably and outgroup members less favorably in allocation tasks.12
Consistent with the literature, we interpret the identity literature as indicating that material
payo¤s are a function of an identity parameter, lets say : u(xown; xother;). Consider two
allocations x and y where own has a higher material payo¤ from x. If according to some level
of identication the agent is indi¤erent between x and y and other is an ingroup member then
an increase in identication implies that the agent strictly prefers y over x. Or more formally,
suppose that xown > yown, xother < yother and u(xown; xother;) = u(yown; yother;). If other
is an ingroup member then u(xown; xother;0) < u(yown; yother;0) for  < 0 and if other is
an outgroup member then u(xown; xother;0) > u(yown; yother;0) for  < 0.
Although we hesitate to ascribe much meaning to the absolute measure of identity, we
8Like SV O, GARP measures preferences through posing a series of dictator games. GARP was developed
by Andreoni and Miller (2002).
9See Deutsch (1958).
10For instance, see Akerlof (1997), Akerlof and Kranton (2000), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Falk and
Fischbacher (2006), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Gul and Pesendorfer (2007) and Levine (1998) for theoretical
modeling of social preferences. Each paper models preferences as a function of the material payo¤s accruing
to both own and other. Some of the above also model preferences as a function of the action of "other."
11There is no consensus regarding the applicability of the link between group identication and bias in
general psychological settings. See Turner (1999) and Brown (2000) for a spirited discussion on this matter.
12Also see Ando (1999), Branscombe and Wann (1994) and Voci (2006).
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do view the change in identity as a measure useful in predicting behavior. Due to possible
idiosyncratic interpretations of the items in the measure, we view the absolute measure with
some scepticism. However, we measure identity several times and so we can account for these
idiosyncrasies by taking the di¤erence in the measures of identity.
There is a recent interest in identity research in experimental economics. Within this
literature, it is not uncommon for the experimenter to manipulate some feature of the envi-
ronment, which the authors ascribe as having a¤ected the identity of the subject. The authors
typically observe the inuence of this manipulation on the behavior in games. For instance,
Charness, Rigotti and Rustichini (2007) manipulate the saliency of groups by allowing ingroup
members to view behavior or by connecting the payo¤s of ingroup members. Eckel and Gross-
man (2005) observes that subjects in treatments with strong identity manipulations contribute
more in repeated public goods games than in treatments with weak manipulations. Ahmed
(2007), Chen and Li (2007) and McLeish and Oxoby (2007) observe the di¤erence in outcomes
of games played between ingroup and outgroup members.13 We primarily distinguish between
our paper and these papers in two respects. First, we do not directly manipulate identity.
Second, we examine the relationship between social identication and the strategic nature of
a game.
Although there is a large and increasing literature of identity in economics, to our knowl-
edge, Guth, Levati and Ploner (2008) is the only other economics paper which measures
identity. The authors investigate the role of identity in behavior in an investment game.
Specically, the authors manipulate identity by placing subjects into groups (X or Y ) and
directing some to play a public good game. This second step is designed to manipulate the
identication of the subjects, which they subsequently measure.14 The authors nd that
subjects who contribute more in the public goods game are signicantly more trusting in the
subsequent investment game. We present a result with a similar avor: those who play co-
operatively against an ingroup member in the Nice Game have a signicantly larger change
in identity than those playing uncooperatively in the Nice Game.
Carpenter (2005) is one of the few economics papers to explicitly investigate the extent to
which a competitive strategic environment can a¤ect social preferences.15 However, there are
fundamental methodological di¤erences between our paper and Carpenter (2005). First, the
subjects in Carpenter receive feedback regarding the action of their opponents. In our paper,
there is no feedback therefore the change in identity which we nd can only be attributed
to the nature of the game and the action selected by the subject. Second, Carpenter uses
Value Orientation (V O)16 and GARP to measure the social preferences of the subjects. By
contrast, we measure other-regarding preferences via identity as is standard in the psychology
literature. Like Carpenter, we measure preferences both before and after the actions have
13For work involving real social groups, see Benjamin et. al. (2007), Ben-Ner et.al. (2006), Goette et. al.
(2006) and Ho¤ and Pandey (2006).
14Although Guth et. al. (2008) use items adapted from Gaertner et. al. (1989) rather than, as we do,
Grieve and Hogg (1999).
15See Canegallo et. al. (2008) for a related paper. Also, Schotter et. al. (1996) examines the e¤ect of
framing on judgements of fairness and is motivated by questions related to endogenous identity. Finally, see
Bowles (1998) for more on endogenous preferences.
16Another measure of social preferences, similar to SV O.
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been selected, however we use the identical measure. By contrast, Carpenter uses V O to
obtain an ex-ante measurement and GARP to obtain an ex-post measurement.
2 Study 1
A total of 130 undergraduate students from a public university in the Northeast United States
participated in the experiment for course credit and entry into a lottery for a cash prize. The
trials were conducted in six classes of 19, 34, 37, 10, 11 and 19 students. In each trial, the
same male experimenter provided the instructions to the subjects. In accordance with the
minimal group literature, we placed students into groups labeled17 "X" and "Y ", where the
allocation was based on the last digit of the students identication number. Students with
digits 0   4 were placed into group X and students with digits 5   9 were placed into group
Y .
Before the subjects played the game, we provided a quick lesson on the basics of 2  2
games. Our experimental manipulation was the nature of the prisoners dilemma game.
Roughly half of each class was given the Mean Game and half the Nice Game.18
Mean Game
Someone Else
You
C D
C 100; 100 0; 150
D 150; 0 50; 50
Nice Game
Someone Else
You
C D
C 100; 100 45; 105
D 105; 45 50; 50
Subjects were told that they were to play the game with every student in their class, in the
same group who received the same game. The subjects were notied that the points attained
in these matches would be converted into an average which would go towards a lottery for
a prize. The subjects were instructed that they were only able to make a single choice to
be used against each ingroup opponent. Finally, subjects were told that the experimenters
would allocate a prize of $50 by means of a lottery in a future class meeting.
2.1 Identication Measure
Our measure of identity was adapted from Grieve and Hogg (1999). We asked the subjects,
how much do you like being a member of a group, how much do you feel that you belong to
the group, how strong are your ties to the group, how pleased are you to belong to the group,
17See Oakes and Turner (1980).
18The subjects were not aware of our name of the games (ie. Nice Game and Mean Game) as this label could
a¤ect behavior in the games. For instance, Liberman et. al. (2004) show that referring to a Prisoners Dilemma
Game as the "Wall Street Game" induces less cooperative behavior than referring to it as the "Community
Game."
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how important is the group to you and how much do you identify with the group. These 6
questions were asked on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 indicated a negative preference, 4 indicated
"no opinion" and 7 indicated a positive preference. We used these items as they are standard
in the psychology literature and appropriate in a minimal group setting.
When constructing a single measure of a latent variable from several survey items we need
to be concerned with the reliability of our measure. As is standard, we calculate the Cronbach
Alpha for our measure at each time period. (See Cronbach (1951) for more on the calculation
of .)
2.2 Competitive and Cooperative Measures
We also seek a measure of the competitive and cooperative nature of the subjects and their
assessment of the competitive and cooperative nature of their choice of action in the game.
The items of our competitiveness measure were adapted from Beersma and DeDreu (1999).
Subjects were provided the following statements, I selected my action only considering my own
welfare and I selected my action so that my outcome is relatively better than the outcome
for my opponents. The subjects were asked to respond to these 2 statements on a scale of
1 to 7, where 1 indicated "strongly disagree", 4 indicated "neither agree nor disagree" and 7
indicated "strongly agree."
Likewise, the items of our cooperation measure were adapted from Beersma and DeDreu
(1999). Subjects were provided the following statements, I selected my action so that my
opponents can depend on me, I selected my action considering how my decisions a¤ect the
welfare of my opponents, I selected my action so that my opponents and I received the best
joint outcome. The subjects were asked to respond to these 3 statements on a scale of 1
to 7, where 1 indicated "strongly disagree", 4 indicated "neither agree nor disagree" and 7
indicated "strongly agree."
2.3 Timeline
We refer to Time 1 as the period in which the subject has been allocated into a group, but
does not know the form of the game to be played (Nice or Mean Game). In Time 1 we
ask standard background questions, in addition to seeking a baseline measurement of group
identity, competitiveness and cooperativeness. We refer to Time 2 as the period in which
the subject has seen the game to be played, but before a choice of action has been made. In
Time 2 we measure group identity. In the beginning of Time 3, the subject selects an action
for the game. Thereafter, we take a competitive and cooperative measure of the perception
of the action of the subject by using an appropriate adaptation of the items. Additionally, in
Time 3 we measure group identity a nal time.
Every response was entered on paper. In order to minimize biasing the subjects towards
previous answers, we collected each sheet after its completion. Additionally, we color coded
the pages so that the we could verify that the subject adhered to the procedure.
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2.4 Results
Below we pool the data which was acquired at di¤erent times and through slightly di¤erent
means. Specically, three trials were conducted in Fall 2007 and three in Spring 2008.
Additionally in the Spring 2008 trials, we asked an additional question, which composes the
content of Study 2 below. To justify pooling the data, we performed a Multivariate Analysis
of Variance (MANOVA) with dependent variables: change in identity between time 1 and 3,
change in identity between time 1 and 2 and change in identity between time 2 and 3. In
the MANOVA, the independent variables were game type, ingroup action selected, a binary
treatment variable and the 4 interaction variables. Among the three, the most signicant had
an F statistic of 0:782 and a signicance of 0:378. Table 1 below lists the F statistic and
the signicance of the relevant parameters in the MANOVA.
[Figure 1 about here]
As a result, Study 1 pools the data from the Fall 2007 and Spring 2008 trials.
The average of the 6 identity questions forms our measure of identity. Our Cronbach
alphas for identity in Time 1, Time 2 and Time 3 are 0:810, 0:858 and 0:885 respectively.
Our Cronbach alphas for cooperativeness in Time 1 and Time 3 are 0:74 and 0:74 respectively.
Our Cronbach alphas for competitiveness in Time 1 and Time 3 are 0:55 and 0:76 respectively.
Table 2 presents a summary of the data by listing the mean identity (and variance in the
parenthesis) according to the action selected at Time 3 and the game type which became
known to the subject at Time 2.
[Table 2 about here]
[Figure 1 about here]
First, we may ask whether the manipulation induced di¤erent action choices. We found
that participants in the Mean Game condition were more likely to chose the uncooperative
choice (42 of 62, 67:7%) and participants in the Nice Game condition were more likely to chose
the cooperative choice (37 of 68, 54:4%), 2 (1; 129) = 6:465, p = :0110.
We note that the action choice a¤ects the identity of subjects. Time 3 identity is signi-
cantly di¤erent for those who played C and those who played D. The t-test has signicance
0:053 and the Mann-Whitney test has signicance 0:036. However, there is no signicant
di¤erence of identity at Time 1 or Time 2 for those playing C or D.
No signicant relationship with identity exists between those received the Nice Game and
those who received the Mean Game. However, signicant relationships across game types
emerge when we restrict attention within an action choice. Figure 1 shows the mean identity
over time for subjects within game type and action. For those who received the Nice Game,
there is a signicant di¤erence (t = 2:470, p = 0:0163) between the Time 3 identity of those
playing C and those playing D. Similarly, among those who received the Nice Game, there
is a signicant di¤erence (t = 1:803, p = 0:0759) between the Time 2 identity of those playing
C and those playing D. An ANOVA of identity at Time 3, with independent variables game
type, choice and an interaction term (F = 2:019, p = 0:115) indicates that the choice term is
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signicant (F = 3:255, p = 0:074). However, no such signicant relationship exists for those
who received the Mean Game.
Although we have found a signicant relationship between absolute levels of identity, per-
haps it is worthwhile to consider the di¤erences in identity. Indeed, among those receiving
the Nice Game, there is a signicant di¤erence in the change in identity between Time 1 and
Time 3 for those who played C and those who played D (t = 1:862, p = 0:0686). Again, no
such signicant relationship exists for those who received the Mean Game. We summarize
this evidence by the following result.
Result 1: For those who received the Nice Game, the subjects who played C identied
signicantly more with the group over time than those who played D. For those who received
the Mean Game, there was no di¤erence in identication for those who played C or D.
A natural question is then, when do these changes in identity occur? Do they occur
between Time 1 and Time 2? Or do they occur between Time 2 and Time 3? If the change
occurs between Time 1 and 2, then it would seem that the subjects correctly anticipated their
subsequent choice and that the act of executing the choice did not signicantly a¤ect their
identity. However, if the change occurs between Time 2 and 3, then the act of executing the
choice signicantly a¤ected their identity. A t-test between the di¤erence in Time 2 and Time
3 identity of those who received the Nice Game and played C and those receiving the Nice
Game who played D is signicant at the 90% level of a one-sided test (t = 1:63, p = 0:109).
Similarly, a t-test between di¤erence in Time 1 and Time 2 identity of those who received the
Nice Game and played C and those receiving the Nice Game who played D is not signicant
(t = 0:757, p = 0:452). On the basis of the above we infer that most of the changes occur
between Time 2 and Time 3. Therefore, the evidence supports the contention that the act
of making the selection a¤ects identity and that the subjects do not correctly anticipate their
choice. We summarize this by the following result.
Result 2: The change in identication which did occur, happened primarily between Time
2 and Time 3 rather than between Time 1 and Time 2.
The responses to the competitive and cooperative items suggest a potential explanation
for the changes in identity discussed above. Recall that at Time 1 a baseline measurement
of competitiveness and cooperativeness is taken. Then at Time 3 we make a measurement
of the perception of the competitiveness and cooperativeness of the action taken. We take
the di¤erence between these Time 1 and Time 3 measurements to better understand how the
subject considers the action undertaken. Table 3 lists the mean values (with variance in
parenthesis) in the tables below.
[Table 3 about here]
First, we ask how the subject considers the actions taken. Across both games, playing
C is considered to be more cooperative than playing D (t = 3:75, p < 0:001). Also across
both games, playing C is considered to be less competitive than playing D (t =  6:0636,
p < 0:001). Therefore, we regard the choice of C as more cooperative and less competitive
than the choice of D.
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Within the Mean Game, playing C is considered to be more cooperative than playing D
(t = 1:315, p = 0:197) although this result is insignicant. Also in the Mean Game, playing
C is considered to be less competitive than playing D (t =  2:594, p = 0:0142). However
these e¤ects are stronger in the Nice Game. In the Nice Game, playing C is considered to
be more cooperative than playing D (t = 3:661, p < 0:001). In the Nice Game, playing C
is considered to be less competitive than playing D (t =  5:797, p < 0:001). Within each
game, playing C is considered to be more cooperative and less competitive than playing D,
however in the Nice game these di¤erences are more pronounced. We summarize this by the
following result.
Result 3: The di¤erence in the perception of the competitiveness and cooperativeness of
playing C and playing D was larger in the Nice Game.
An implication of the evidence above seems to be that taking an action which is considered
to be less competitive or more cooperative tends to be associated with a larger positive change
in identity. As playing C is considered to be more cooperative and less competitive than
playing D, we see the former exhibiting a stronger identity than the latter. Further, the
di¤erence in the perception of cooperativeness and competitiveness for playing C and D is
larger in the Nice Game than in the Mean Game. As such, we view Result 3 as a possible
explanation for Result 1. Playing C in the Nice Game is perceived to be more cooperative
and less competitive than playing D, whereas the relationship within the Mean Game is less
signicant. As a result, based on the action selected we nd a larger change in identity in the
Nice Game than in the Mean Game.
3 Study 2
Study 2 uses a subset of the trials from Study 1. Specically, Study 2 pertains to the data
obtained in Spring 2008 with a total of 40 subjects. In addition to asking for a single action
for ingroup matches, the trials in Study 2 also requested a single action for outgroup matches.
Study 2 subjects were told that they were to play the game with every student in their class,
in the same group and the other group, who received the game game. The subjects were
notied that the points attained in the ingroup and outgroup matches would be converted
into averages, which would go towards a lottery for the $50 cash prize. As the di¤erence
between Study 1 and 2 lies in the presence of the choice against outgroup subjects, our results
here will primarily focus on the new insights gained from this additional question.
3.1 Results
Table 4 lists the number of subjects who selected each action prole (action against ingroup
members, action against outgroup members) and the game in which they made their decision.
[Table 4 about here]
Table 5 presents the summary of the data by listing the mean identity according to the
action selected at Time 3 (listed (action against ingroup members, action against outgroup
members)) and the game type which became known to the subject at Time 2.
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[Table 5 about here]
As we have data on the choice of action against ingroup opponents and the choice of action
against outgroup opponents, we analyze the predictive power of identity on these outcomes.
We will say that an action prole which selects di¤erent actions for ingroup and outgroup as
discriminatory. Therefore, proles of either C for ingroup opponents and D for outgroup
opponents or D for ingroup opponents and C for outgroup opponents will be classied as
discriminatory. Action proles which select the same action for both ingroup and outgroup
are classied as nondiscriminatory. See Figure 2 for an illustration of mean identity over
time, sorted by the discriminatory nature of the action prole.
[Figure 2 about here]
A t-test of identity at Time 1 of those who played a discriminatory action (Mean = 4:304,
V ariance = 0:730) and identity at Time 1 of those who played a nondiscriminatory action
(Mean = 3:803, V ariance = 0:517) is signicant (t = 1:959, p = 0:0592). While the evidence
that ex-ante identity can predict subsequent behavior is not very strong, the evidence that
ex-ante identity can predict the discriminatory nature of subsequent behavior is quite strong.
We summarize this in the following result.
Result 4: Time 1 identity is a signicant predictor of discriminatory actions in Time 3.
Recall that the evidence from Study 1 suggested that in the Nice Game, those who played
C against in an ingroup member had a signicantly stronger identity than those who played
D. However in the Mean Game, there was no signicant di¤erence in identity of those who
played C against an ingroup member and those who played D. Analysis of Study 2 data
reveals an analogous nding. Figure 3 illustrates mean identity over time, sorted by the game
type and action against outgroup subjects.
[Figure 3 about here]
We now analyze the change in identity given the game type and the choice of action against
outgroup members. The di¤erence between the change in identity at Time 3 and Time 1
for those in the Nice Game who played C against an outgroup member (Mean =  0:357,
V ariance = 0:180) and the the change in identity at Time 3 and Time 1 for those in the Nice
Game who played D against an outgroup member (Mean =  0:0119, V ariance = 0:485) is
not signicant (t = 1:41, p = 0:177). However, the di¤erence between the change in identity
at Time 3 and Time 1 for those in the Mean Game who played C against an outgroup member
(Mean = 0:226, V ariance = 1:351) and the the change in identity at Time 3 and Time 1
for those in the Mean Game who played D against an outgroup member (Mean =  0:867,
V ariance = 0:400) is signicant (t = 2:51, p = 0:0276). Therefore, actions against outgroup
members has a signicant e¤ect in the Mean Game, but not in the Nice Game. We summarize
this evidence in the following result.
Result 5: For those who received the Mean Game, the subjects who played C identied
signicantly more with the group over time than those who played D. For those who received
the Nice Game, there was no di¤erence in identication for those who played C or D in
outgroup matches.
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Therefore, we conclude that the action against ingroup members a¤ects identity in the
Nice Game more than in the Mean Game and that the action against outgroup members
a¤ects identity more in the Mean Game than in the Nice Game.
4 Conclusion
We have provided evidence related to the endogenous nature of identity in games. We have
found that the identity of a subject is a¤ected by the action taken and the strategic setting
in which the action was taken. Those subjects who received the Nice Game and played C
against an ingroup member has a signicantly stronger change in identity than those who
played D. We also found that the subjects who received the Mean Game and played C
against an outgroup member has a stronger change in identity than those who played D.
Additionally, we have found that the identity change which does occur, happens mainly after
the subject selects an action. Finally, we present evidence that the change in identity is
strengthened by actions which are considered to be less competitive and more cooperative. We
view the evidence presented here as challenging the assumption that preferences are constant
throughout a one-shot strategic game without feedback.
It is worth reecting on the limitations of the study and the possibilities for future work.
In the present experiment there was no feedback regarding the action of the opponents. It is
unclear how feedback, or the anticipation of the feedback, would a¤ect the change in identi-
cation. Also, the experiment only contained a single play of the game. It is unclear how the
endogenous identity described in this experiment would a¤ect future behavior in a repeated
decision setting. It is possible that the new identity would revert back to its original form
thus not a¤ecting behavior or perhaps the endogenous identity would have a lasting inuence
on behavior. It is also not clear how the results of this study apply to other standard games
such as chicken, assurance or the stag hunt. Additionally, it is unclear how the results apply
to groups which are not minimal. It is possible that minimal group members display either
a more or less malleable identity than members of less trivial groups. Hopefully future work
can clarify these issues. Finally, note that playing D rather than C in the Mean Game yields
the subject a gain 50 points while costing the opponent 100 points. Playing D rather than C
in the Nice Game yields the subject a gain 5 points while costing the opponent 50 points. It
is unclear exactly how these gains and costs a¤ect the change in identication of the player.
We hope that future work can tease out this relationship.
The results of our paper suggests that measuring other-regarding preferences with SV O
or GARP might a¤ect the very preferences which they are intended to measure. In our
experiment other-regarding preferences, as measured by identity, changed in a manner which
depended on the specication of the Prisoners Dilemma game, the action selected and the
group a¢ liation of the opponent. It is possible that these e¤ects also occur when the subject
plays the dictator game, the means of measuring other-regarding preferences via SV O and
GARP . If this is the case then measuring preferences by SV O or GARP might a¤ect those
preferences which they are designed to measure. We hope future work will address this
question.
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ID 3  ID 2 ID 3  ID 1 ID 2  ID 1
Treatment 0:284 0:782 0:270
(0:595) (0:378) (0:605)
Treatment-Game Interaction 0:000 0:238 0:274
(0:993) (0:627) (0:601)
Treatment-Action Interaction 0:606 0:485 1:417
(0:606) (0:487) (0:236)
Treatment-Action-Game Interaction 0:007 0:995 1:336
(0:934) (0:321) (0:250)
Table 1: F statistics and corresponding signicance of MANOVA
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Mean Identity at Time 1
ID 1 M N Total
C 4:23167 4:35135 4:14338
(1:11725) (1:20800) (1:15896)
D 4:19444 4:07419 4:30936
(0:72482) (0:52213) (0:63388)
Total 4:20645 4:22500 4:21615
(0:83548) (0:90220) (0:86374)
Mean Identity at Time 2
ID 2 M N Total
C 4:24583 4:28829 4:27339
(1:05371) (0:92230) (0:95083)
D 4:23810 3:88710 4:08904
(0:83759) (0:76183) (0:82491)
Total 4:24059 4:10539 4:16987
(0:89119) (0:87720) (0:88161)
Mean Identity at Time 3
ID 3 M N Total
C 4:13333 4:39640 4:30409
(1:29708) (1:00980) (1:10528)
D 4:06667 3:75269 3:93333
(1:17095) (1:25902) (1:21580)
Total 4:08817 4:10294 4:09590
(1:19202) (1:21064) (1:19251)
Table 2: Mean identity by game type and action
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Figure 1: Mean Identity Across Time By Game Type and Ingroup Action
Mean Di¤erence in Competitiveness
Comp 3  1 M N Total
C  0:0167  0:374  0:249
(1:783) (1:724) (1:743)
D 0:881 1:430 1:114
(1:284) (1:557) (1:454)
Total 0:5914 0:4485 0:5617
(1:597) (2:443) (2:029)
Mean Di¤erence in Cooperativeness
Coop 3  1 M N Total
C  1:325  0:831  1:004
(2:231) (2:469) (2:401)
D  1:845  2:218  2:0034
(1:890) (2:378) (2:102)
Total  1:6774  1:4632  1:5654
(2:025) (2:875) (2:463)
Table 3: Mean Di¤erence in Time 1 and Time 3 Competitiveness and Cooperativeness by
action and game type
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Total M N Total
CC 4 5 9
CD 1 9 10
DC 5 2 7
DD 9 5 14
Total 19 21 40
Table 4: Number of subjects by action prole (ingroup action,outgroup action) and game
type
Mean Identity at Time 1
ID 1 M N Total
CC 3:700 3:667 3:681
CD 3:167 4:519 4:383
DC 4:233 4:083 4:190
DD 3:926 3:800 3:881
Total 3:919 4:103 4:016
Mean Identity at Time 2
ID 2 M N Total
CC 3:938 3:500 3:694
CD 3:000 4:519 4:367
DC 4:400 3:500 4:142
DD 3:389 3:767 3:524
Total 3:750 4:000 3:881
Mean Identity at Time 3
ID 3 M N Total
CC 3:750 3:500 3:611
CD 2:667 4:574 4:383
DC 4:600 3:250 4:214
DD 3:019 3:667 3:250
Total 3:570 3:976 3:783
Table 5: Mean identity by action prole (ingroup action,outgroup action) and game type
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